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INTRODUCTION
The Ethics of TransracialAdoption by Professor Hawley Fogg-Davis raises
timely and provocative issues about a subject that has both fascinated and
troubled the American public for more than three decades. In light of the fact
that the actual number of Black children adopted by Whites represents only a
tiny fraction of the number of adoptions completed each year in this coun-

try,' it is significant that this issue continues to command such attention.
Although the intensity of the debate has varied, transracial adoption has been
publicly debated on a recurring basis since the 1970s, a time when transracial
adoptions began to increase2 and the National Association of Black Social
Workers began to publicly express opposition to the placement of Black chil3
dren in White adoptive homes.
Transracial adoption continues to intrigue and trouble Americans because it touches on many issues that evoke a strong emotional response: the
bonds of family, the love between parents and children, and the responsibilities
*

Professor of Law and Judge Alexander T.Waugh, Sr. Scholar, Rutgers University

School of Law-Newark.This book review grew out of my presentation at the Joint Meetings of the Law and Society Association and the Canadian Law and Society Association,
Vancouver, Canada (May 2002), Author-Meets-Reader:Navigating Race and Politics in Adoption:
The Ethics ofTransracialAdoption by Hawley Fogg-Davis.
1.
HAWLEY FOGG-DAvIS,THE Emucs OF TRANsRciAL ADOPTION 3 (2002). Children of
various ethnicities may be involved in transracial adoptions. Fogg-Davis' book and this book
review address transracial adoptions involving Black children and White adoptive parents.
2.
See id.
3.
See id.; RITAJ. SIMON ET AL.,TiE CASE FOR TRANSRAciAL ADOPTION 23 n.24,40-41
(1994).
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of parents to teach their children how to survive and thrive in a complex and
challenging world. The transracial adoption debate also reflects this country's
potent legacy of racial discrimination, including antimiscegenation laws spe4
cifically designed to prevent the formation of interracial families.
In recent years, the debate over transracial adoption within legal scholarship has been identified as reflecting two perspectives.5 One perspective is
represented by advocates of transracial adoption who argue that adoption
should be colorblind. 6The other perspective, in which views lie along a continuum, is represented by those who argue that Black children should not be
placed with White families at all or only as a last resort.7 This latter group, in
which I place myself,' argues, in essence, that in America, race always matters
and that to place Black children for adoption without considering the issues
they will inevitably confront growing up in a racist society is a disservice to
the children. Some who urge this perspective further believe that many of the
arguments in favor of transracial adoption devalue Black families and that
placing Black children in White families undermines the strength of the
Black community by removing potentially valuable human resources.9
In The Ethics of TransracialAdoption,Fogg-Davis attempts to bridge the
gap between these two views. Eschewing membership in either camp and
addressing the issue primarily in terms of ethics rather than law, Fogg-Davis
argues that race should not be an absolute barrier to adoption, but rather it
4.
The Supreme Court declared such statutes unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia,388
U.S. 1 (1967).
5.
Twila L. Perry, The TransracialAdoptionControversy:An Analysis of Discourseand Subordination, 21 N.YU. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 43-47 (1993-94) [hereinafter Perry, The
TransracialAdoptionControversy] (describing two competing perspectives:"colorblind individualism," which is based on optimism about the eradication of racism in America, a belief in
colorblindness as a societal goal, and a focus on the individual as the unit for analyzing rights
and interests, and "color and community consciousness," which isbased on a more pessimistic
view of the permanence of racism, a belief in multiculturalism as opposed to colorblindness
or assimilation, and the view that in analyzing rights and interests, the group as well as the
individual must be taken into account).
6.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, W4here Do Black Children Belong? Th7e Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991). Others advocating colorblindness in
adoption include Randall Kennedy and Laurence Tribe. See FoGc-DAvIs, supra note 1, at 44.
7.
See, e.g.,James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences:The Nexus Between
PutativeAfro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26J. FAM. L. 487,528-32
(1987-88); Ruth-Arlene W Howe, TransracialAdoption(TRA): Old Prejudicesand Discrimination
Float Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB. IT. L.J. 409,464-72 (1997); Perry, The TransracialAdoption
Controversy, supra note 5, at 39-40.
8.
I have written extensively about transracial adoption. See generally Perry, The TransracialAdoption Controversy,supra note 5; Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement:The Best Interests
Test and The Cost of Discretion, 29J. FAxv. L. 51 (1990-91) [hereinafter Perry, Race and Child
Placement]; Twila L. Perry, Transracial and InternationalAdoption: Mothers, Hierarchy,Race, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (1998) [hereinafter Perry, Transracialand
InternationalAdoption]. I am also in the process of completing a book manuscript tentatively
entitled TiANsCIsciAL ADOPTION: BLACKS,WHITEs, AND THE RACIAL DIVIDE.
9.
Perry, The TransracialAdoptionControversy, supra note 5, at 68.
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should be permissible to consider race as a factor in the placement of individual children.This book review offers a critique of Fogg-Davis' attempt to
carve out a middle ground. Part I of this book review will provide a legal
background to the controversy over transracial adoption. Part II will summarize the author's description of her position as taking a middle ground in the
transracial adoption debate. Part III will examine the book's discussion of the
ethical issues raised by transracial adoption.The first section of Part III will
focus on Fogg-Davis' opposition to the practice of parents passing on society's
racial definitions to their transracially adopted children. The second section
will examine Fogg-Davis' discussion of the ethical implications of assigning
children for adoption on the basis of race. This review concludes that The
Ethics of TransracialAdoption raises some interesting issues concerning transracial adoption but does not go as far as it should in exploring the political and
practical implications of the author's arguments.
I.TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION AND THE LAW

The focus of Fogg-Davis' book is on the ethical rather than the legal issues raised by transracial adoption. Ethical inquiries often seek to determine
the morally correct approach to a particular issue. In contrast, legal analysis
usually addresses what is permissible under the law.These approaches are different, yet related-ideally, legal determinations should embody sound values
and arrive at results that are morally justified. Thus, before examining FoggDavis' ethical analysis of transracial adoption, it is helpful to situate the
transracial adoption debate within a legal context.
The current law governing transracial adoption is a combination of
longstanding common law principles, more recent judicial decisions, statutory
law, and federal regulations. First, the longstanding common law principle
applied in child placement decisions is the best interests of the child rule.
Although this rule, which often employs a multi-factor balancing test in order
to reach a result that is best for the individual child, has been criticized as being subjective and indeterminate, it retains widespread popularity."
Second,judicial decisions provide context for the transracial adoption
debate.The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether

10.
See, e.g., Chapsky v.Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); see alsoJo Beth Eubanks, Comment,
TransracialAdoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests Standard Be Color-Blind?,24 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1225,1233-35 (1993) ("The best interests standard has been widely used as the appropriate
test in deciding child placement, both in custody and adoption proceedings. Generally, the
best interests standard holds that the sole guideline in determining placement of the child
should be furtherance of the welfare of the child."); Perry, Race and Child Placement,supranote
8, at 54.
11.
See Perry, Race and Child Placement, supra note 8, at 57-60; see also Jon Elster, SoloinonicJudgnients:Againstthe Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1987); Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226,257-61 (1975).

218
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race may be used as a factor in adoption. The most relevant case to date is
Palmore v. Sidoti.12 Palmore is the only case in which the Supreme Court has
discussed the relationship between race and the best interests of the child test
in a child placement context. In Palmore,a 1984 case, following the divorce of
a White couple, in which custody of the couple's three-year-old White
daughter was awarded to the mother, the mother began to live with and later
married a Black man.' 3 As a result, the child's father sought custody of the
child, claiming that the child would be stigmatized if she remained in a home
with her mother and a Black stepfather."4 The lower court ordered the change
in custody. 5 On review, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny analysis
and required that the use of race as the basis for governmental action bejustified by a compelling governmental interest and be necessary to the
accomplishment of a legitimate purpose. 6 The Supreme Court went on to
find that the best interests of the child is a substantial governmental interest
for purposes of equal protection analysis;" however, the lower court's consideration of race as the sole basis for its decision did not survive strict scrutiny
and thus violated equal protection." Since Palmorewas a custody case, there is
no agreement on whether it applies to the context of transracial adoption.
However, since Palmore, a number of state and federal court decisions have
upheld at least a moderate use of race in adoption. 9
Third, Congress has also addressed the issue of transracial adoption. In
1996, Congress promulgated the Interethnic Amendments to the Multiethnic
Placement Act, which prohibit the use of race to delay or deny the placement
of children for adoption by agencies receiving public funds."° Questions re-

12.
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
13.
Id. at 430-31.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 431.
16.
Id. at 432-33.
17.
Id. at 433.
18.
Id. at 433-34.
19.
See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989) (permitting consideration
of race in foster care placements); In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982) (upholding a statute permitting consideration of race in adoption proceedings); Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding race as a
relevant factor in adoption); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614,624 (Pa. 1983) (noting that race may
not be unduly emphasized by the placement agency).
20.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1996(b) (West Supp. 2003).The originally enacted version of the
Multiethnic Placement Act prohibited delay in the placement of a child for the purpose of
seeking a same-race match; however, the Act also explicitly contemplated the consideration of
race if such consideration did not result in delay. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5115a(a) (West 1995 &
Supp. 2003) (repealed 1996).The current Act states:
A person or government that is involved in adoption or foster care placements
may not-
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main about whether the amendments were intended to completely bar the
use of race,21 and, if so, the degree to which the amendments are being enforced.2 2 In 1998, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a set
of administrative guidelines regarding the amendments.23 There is a lack of
consensus as to whether the guidelines may be interpreted to permit consideration of race on a case-by-case basis as part of the individualized assessments
agencies traditionally perform with respect to all prospective adoptive par4
ents.

2

Finally, some legal scholars are trying to shape the governing law on
transracial adoption. Some contend that the issue of race in adoption must be
examined within the framework of Supreme Court jurisprudence on af26
firmative action, 25 which has become increasingly hostile to the use of race.
Others reject this view and argue that more appropriate analogies lie in areas
such as voting rights, where the Court has permitted the use of race in redistricting, provided that it is not the predominant factor.27

(A) deny to any individual the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster
parent, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the individual,
or of the child, involved; or
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster
parent, or the child, involved.
42 U.S.C.A. 5 1996b(l) (West Supp. 2003).
21.
See, e.g., FoGG-DAvIs, supra note 1, at 49 (arguing that the amendments were not
intended to be implemented in a completely colorblind manner); RANDALL KENNEDY, IN'ERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 400

(2003) (arguing that the

amendment "rescinds authorization to consider race as a factor at all").
22.
KENNEDY, supra note 21, at 400 (arguing that the amendment has not terminated
the practice of race matching).
23.
FOGG-DAvis, supra note 1, at 49.
24.

See id. at 49-50; see also JOAN

HEIFETZ HOLLINGER & THE ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN

AND THE LAW NAT'L RES. CTR. ON LEGAL AND COURT ISSUES,
PLACEMENT ACT OF

1994

A

GUIDE TO THE MULTIETHNIC

AS AMENDED BY THE INTERETHNIC ADOPTION PROVISIONS OF

19969-

10 (1998).This guide states:
While explicitly prohibiting the use of race, color, or national origin to deny a
foster care or adoptive placement, MEPA-IEP does not require that these factors must always be ignored when an agency or caseworker makes an
individualized assessment of a particular child to determine the kind of placement that will serve that child's best interests. The 1997 and 1998 HHS
Guidances indicate that in exceptional, non-routine, circumstances, a child's
best interests may warrant some consideration of needs based on race or ethnicity.
Id.
25.
26.
27.
provided

See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1228-37, 1243-45.
See infra notes 89-90.
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (legitimizing the use of race in redistricting
that race is not the predominant factor).
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The current state of the law does not provide a clear answer to the
question of whether or how race may be considered as a factor in adoption.
Moreover, the future of the law governing transracial adoption remains to be
seen. However, there is also a continuing exploration of the issue in other
contexts. For example, in recent years, there have been an increasing number
of first person accounts of transracial adoption, some written by White adoptive parents of Black children, 8 and others by transracial adoptees
themselves. 29 The perspectives of these persons with respect to their own experiences as well as their views regarding the desirability of transracial
adoption and the role of race in adoptive placements are certain to enrich the
evolving legal analysis in this complex and controversial area.
II.

STAKING OUT A MIDDLE GROUND

In the continuing contentious debate over transracial adoption, FoggDavis seeks to stake out a middle ground. She argues that race should not be
an absolute barrier to adoption, but rather it should be a permissible consideration. This position is consistent with cases in which courts have permitted
a moderate use of race in child placement cases.' Fogg-Davis describes her
position as being in opposition to what she claims are two polar extremes in
the political and scholarly discourse: the strict colorblind approach and "racial
solidity.""1
Fogg-Davis rejects the strict colorblind approach on the grounds that it
"is practically impossible in a race-conscious world ' 3 2 and "a disingenuous
refrain that is selectively applied in equal-protection law to ensure prospective
adopters the equal opportunity to adopt a [B]lack child if they so desire.""
Fogg-Davis is also troubled by the impact of increased privatization in adoption, which she views as ensuring racial choice for those Whites who have the
resources to circumvent the public adoption system.34 Similarly, Fogg-Davis is
concerned about the consumerist ideology increasingly driving adoption as

28.

See, e.g.,J. DouGLAs BATES, GIFT CHILDREN: A STORY

OF RACE, FAMILY,

AND ADOP-

TION IN A DIVIDED AMERICA (1993); SHARON E. PUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE: A
WHITE ADOPTIVE MOTHER LEARNs ABOUT R-ACE (2000) ;JANA WOLFF, SECRET THOuGHTS OF AN
ADOPTIVE MOTHER (1997).
29.

See, e.g.,I ITAJ. SIMON & LHONDA M. ROORDA, IN THEIR OWNVOICES:TANSRACIAL

ADOPTEES TELL THEIR STORIES (2000);Asher D. Isaacs, InterracialAdoption:PermanentPlacement
and Racial Identity-An Adoptee's Perspective, 14 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 126 (1996); Rachel Noerdlinger, A Last Resort: The Identity My ihite Parents Couldn't Give Me, WASH. POST,June 30,
1996, at C3.
30.
See cases cited supra note 19.
31.

FOGG-DAviS, supra note 1, at 9-11.

32.
33.
34.

Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 82.
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well as new reproductive technologies. 5 Fogg-Davis understands how these
trends support transracial adoption advocacy by furthering the idea that people who wish to adopt are entitled to choose the characteristics, including the
36
race, of the children they will bring into their families.
On the other hand, Fogg-Davis also rejects what she terms an opposite
extreme of"racial solidity," which she describes as a "non-negotiable description of [B]lackness that is often couched in cultural specificity."37 She argues
that theories of racial solidity "steamroll racial complexity,"'38 attempt to set a
"solid, inflexible notion of racial self-identification," 39 and lead to "intragroup
policing."4 According to Fogg-Davis, "[i]nstead of seeing [B]lack culture as
choice, advocates of racial solidity present [B]lack culture as fixed, "natural,"
41
and necessary for developing the right kind of racial self-understanding."'
Fogg-Davis objects to what she describes as cultural nationalist arguments in
the transracial adoption debate. 42 She argues that "political arguments
couched in [B]lack cultural nationalism are especially pernicious because they
43
stamp essentialism with a legal seal of approval.."
Although Fogg-Davis' rejection of the strict colorblind approach and
racial solidity in favor of a middle ground position may appear to be a safe
place, sometimes it is not. Positing oneself as occupying middle ground can
sometimes be viewed as a tactic designed to make ones' own position appear
more reasonable than those of others whom one describes as operating from
presumably less rational polar extremes. Adopting a middle ground position
can also be viewed as an indication of confusion, ambivalence, or fear of
committing to a more controversial position.
III. "RACIAL

NAvIGATION," "RACIAL RANDOMIZATION,"
AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

Although Fogg-Davis devotes some time to the legal and sociological
arguments surrounding transracial adoption, her focus is primarily on what
she defines as the ethical issues. It is a substantial challenge to discuss transracial adoption as an ethical matter because there are many issues that invite
exploration from this perspective. For example, the racism, patriarchy, and
poverty that result in the removal of so many Black children from their birth

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

86-91.
91.
103-04.
102.
18.

at 54.
at 62-63.
at 63.
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families, 4 the disparagement of Black families in the public discourse, 4 and
the exploitation of the colorblindness argument in transracial adoption advocacy by right-wing conservatives to further a broad anti-affirmative action
agenda46 are all issues with substantial ethical dimensions.
The ethical issues Fogg-Davis identifies and zeroes in on are: first, the
practice of parents who transracially adopt accepting and passing on society's
racial designations to their children; and second, the moral implications of the
assignment of children for adoption on the basis of race. As vehicles for exploring these ethical questions, Fogg-Davis introduces what she describes as
two theoretical threads: racial navigation and racial randomization. FoggDavis' principle of racial navigation suggests that rather than people accepting
society's racial designations, they should be allowed to create "flexible racial
41
self-understandings in a lifelong process of self-reflection and-revision.
With her principle of racial randomization, Fogg-Davis suggests a "thought
experiment" in which children are placed in adoptive homes without regard
to race.48

A. Racial Navigation
Through her concept of racial navigation, Fogg-Davis seeks to challenge what she claims is the prevailing assumption in this country that
children should acquire their racial identity from their parents. She describes
this method of racial identification as a burden of "racial ascription." 49 She
argues that rather than being assigned racial identities by parents or by society,
children should develop or "activate" their own racial identities in dialogue
with many people over the course of a lifetime.' Fogg-Davis' view is that
rather than affirm the racial identities society assigns to children,"[f]amilies
...should be launching pads for initiating a lifelong process of flexible racial
self-identification.""1
44.
See Perry, Transracialand InternationalAdoption, supra note 8 (discussing the roles of
racism, patriarchy, and poverty in the surrender of children for adoption).
45.
See Perry, The TransracialAdoptionControversy, supra note 5, at 88-98 (discussing the
disparagement of Black families in the transracial adoption discourse).
See id. at 77-78 (discussing the intersection between colorblind discourse in trans46.
racial adoption and the conservative agenda).
47.
FOGG-DAvis, supra note 1,at 2.
Id. at 11.
48.
49.
Fogg-Davis uses various terms including "racial ascription," "racial imposition,"
"racial confinement," and "racial pigeonholing," to convey the idea that society assigns racial
identities to individuals rather than permitting them to choose their racial identities themat 13, 16, 25, 30-31,60,108, 113. She describes racial ascription as "an involuntary
selves. Id.
association that affects our self-understandings," and contrasts racial ascription with "firstperson racial self-identification," which she sees as a positive approach to the issue of the
determination of race. Id. at 60, 114.
50.
Id.
at 13, 32.
51.
Id. at 13.
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Fogg-Davis describes her principle of racial navigation as a "compromise between the social-scientific treatment of race as a static variable in
human behavior and political-theory arguments forjustice that imagine colorblind utopias, 5' 2 and as "a metaphor for mediating the personal and
political meaning of race.""3 She offers it as an alternative to what she calls the
"trap of racial confinement." 4 Fogg-Davis further argues that racial navigation should not be limited to transracial adoptees. She urges that it be
practiced by everyone, including Blacks who are not transracially adopted,
and Whites, whom she says, should encourage racial navigation in their own
lives and in the lives of their children.
Although Fogg-Davis complains about the advantages Whites possess in
the adoption system, her main focus is her disagreement with the assignment
of a racial identity to transracially adopted children. Fogg-Davis believes that
this is wrong, and given the title of her book, unethical. Since virtually all
transracial adoptions are by Whites of Black children, Fogg-Davis' argument,
as a practical matter, seems to be that it is morally wrong for Whites who
adopt Black children to tell the children that they are Black. Instead, she argues that through the racial navigation process, transracially adopted children
should be allowed to choose their own racial identity as they grow up.
In one sense, Fogg-Davis' concept of racial navigation, which is a strategy rather than a legal principle, describes what is actually a familiar process
for most Black people.The fact is, many Blacks, whether transracially adopted
or not, practice a kind of racial navigation as they deal with race in their everyday lives. The term "navigation" brings to mind the idea of a person
carefully steering between two sides and attempting to avoid hitting, and thus
being injured, by either. Many Blacks survive both personally and professionally by forging a careful path between the White world and the Black world.
Moreover, many Black professionals also perform a careful act of navigation
within the Black world, steering carefully between the Black middle class and
the Black lower class. In each of these contexts, the forging of a personal
identity, finding a place in this racially complex world, is done in the context
of personal experiences and in dialogue with others. It is likely that because
of their family history, transracial adoptees perform a somewhat different and
perhaps more complex act of racial navigation. However, many Blacks already
steer through and find places in a racially complicated world and Fogg-Davis
does not make it clear how her process of racial navigation differs for transracial adoptees from the experiences of other Black people.
It might be helpful, in considering Fogg-Davis' idea, to think about racial navigation as having two related, but different meanings-one external
and one internal. The external meaning of racial navigation concerns how a
person society defines as Black functions in the world as a practical matter-

52.

Id. at 5.

53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 16.
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professionally, politically, and socially. This is the sense of the term as it was
discussed above. The internal meaning of racial navigation, and the way in
which Fogg-Davis seems to be using the term, involves the question of how a
person society identifies as Black self-identifies.This quest for self-definition
is largely a private one, but it inevitably takes into account the powerful public reality that in this society people are assigned racial identities.
Another significant problem with Fogg-Davis' argument that transracial
adoptees should not be forced to adopt a Black identity, but rather be given
the freedom to develop their own racial identity, is that she presents the argument in a manner that suggests that it would apply equally to all transracial
adoptees regardless of their appearance or racial heritage.This seems odd, because as a practical matter, Fogg-Davis' argument would only seem to apply
to those transracial adoptees who are either biracial or appear to be so.Whatever one might think about the ethics or morality of racial classifications, it
seems very odd to seriously recommend that the White parents of a darkskinned transracially adopted Black child tell the child that he can choose his
race. Although at one point, Fogg-Davis notes that the fact that most of the
babies adopted by Whites are either biracial or appear to be biracial even
where both biological parents self-identify as Black is one issue virtually
never discussed in the transracial adoption controversy,55 she never connects
this point to her central argument that transracial adoptees should not automatically be given a Black racial identity by their parents. It is not clear
whether Fogg-Davis is unaware of the centrality of the issue of biracialism to
her theme, or whether she is aware of it but has consciously chosen not to
make it explicit. In any event, the issue looms very large as a subtext to the
entire book.
The argument that parents do not have the right to automatically pass
on society's racial designations to their children does raise some interesting
broader questions and legal issues. For example: What are the limits of parental rights? What are the autonomy rights of children in terms of defining their
own futures? What are the responsibilities of parents, and in particular, parents
who raise children in a race conscious society? In the well-known 1972 case,
Wisconsin v.Yoder, 6 the Supreme Court upheld the right of Amish parents to
remove their children from the public school system after the eighth grade.
The parents were concerned that by pursuing further education, the children
would be exposed to, and possibly inculcated with, values that were contrary

55.
Id. at 85-86; see also KENNEDY, supra note 21, at 449 (noting the prevalence ofbiracial children among transracial adoptees). The only law review article addressing this issue is
Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, "here Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classificationin America
and Its ImplicationsforTransracialAdoption,29 HpAuv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rv. 531 (1994) (arguing for
the use of a "multiracial" category in the Census and in daily life, and arguing that multiracial
children should be placed in adoptive homes where there is at least one parent who represents at least one of the heritages in the child's ancestry).
56.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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to those of the Amish society 7 in which their parents assumed that they
would continue to live as adults. As a practical matter, the decision in favor of
the parents gave them the power to curtail their children's access to a whole
range of opportunities in the wider world.
Today, many people would disagree with the Supreme Court's decision
in Yoder and support the position that parents' fears, prejudices, and limitations
should not prevent their children from reaching their fullest potential. Parents
do not own children, children are not property, and each child should have
the right to at least entertain options for a life that goes beyond the choices
his or her parents may have made, or had imposed on their own lives. Likewise, Fogg-Davis' implicit argument is that parents who "go along" with
society's racial definition of their children are somehow limiting their children's potential by placing them in a racial box that will restrict their
opportunities to become full, rich, and complex human beings.
This argument is somewhat naive. In a world in which race still determines so many of a person's opportunities and obstacles, parents raising Black
children have certain obligations, whether the children are transracially
adopted or not. Helping a child to achieve clarity about racial identity does
not foreclose options that a child would otherwise have; to the contrary, it
assists the child in achieving a sense of place and a sense of peace that will
help him or her move effectively in a racially complicated world.
Let us assume, for example that a teenage biracial boy has been adopted
and raised by White parents. What should his White parents tell him about
race and about the race with which he will inevitably be identified? What
should they tell him about encounters between young minority men and the
police? To provide that child with a Black identity is not a matter of acquiescence to "racial ascription," it is a matter of ensuring the child's survival-his
very life. Indeed, other than making clear her view that the parent should not
"assign" her Black child a Black racial identity, Fogg-Davis never makes it
clear what a White parent who has adopted a child the society identifies as
Black should tell the child about race.Would it make any difference whether
it was a biracial child or not? Would it make any difference depending on
how White or Black the particular child appeared to be? Because the focus of
this book is on ethical concerns, the author may have decided not to deal
with such practical issues, but arguments about the interests of children need
to be grounded in the realities of children's lives.
In a sense, this is precisely what the best interests of the child rule 58 is intended to accomplish. Thus, in deciding whether or not a particular home
would be an appropriate placement for a child, an important factor to consider would be whether the prospective adoptive parents are capable of
understanding the issues the child will inevitably face as the result of living in
a race-conscious and racist society. Further specificity as to the approach she

57.
58.

See id. at 211.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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recommends, along with some examples that illustrate how it might be preferable to traditional wisdom and practices, might have made some of FoggDavis' arguments concerning the racial identification of children more convincing.
It is also important to note that Fogg-Davis' argument that transracially
adopted children whom society deems Black should not have that identity
affirmed by their adoptive parents is completely contrary to the findings of
the vast majority of sociologists who have studied transracially adopted children. Most of the research on this group of children has concluded that the
adjustment of transracially adopted children is best promoted when their parents explicitly accept and embrace the child's most obvious and most likely
racial designation. 9 The first-person accounts of transracial adoptees also support this perspective.' It is surprising that Fogg-Davis' book does not address
these findings which obviously have an important bearing on the book's central argument.
Fogg-Davis not only argues that White parents should not force a Black
identity on their transracially adopted children, but also that Black parents do
Black children a disservice by passing on a Black identity to them. Here, the
language is harsh: she describes passing on Black identity as the "[p]assive absorption of racial classification," 6' "racial reductionism, 62 and "racial retreat."'63
Indeed, the impression one receives from Fogg-Davis' discussion is that she
believes that it is cowardly for those deemed Black not to rebel against that
racial label and that it is an act of courage to demand the option of racial selfdefinition. Fogg-Davis states that she is looking for creative ways to respond
to racial imposition' and that it is important to seek to achieve "a strong
sense of personal agency in shaping one's life." 6 However, the language and
arguments employed convey the impression that Fogg-Davis views the acceptance of a Black identity as akin to serving time in prison for a crime you did
not commit. The suggestion seems to be that a strong Black identity inevitably stifles individuality, is culturally limiting, and forecloses the possibility that,
for example, a Black Nationalist might enjoy Tosca.
It is not irrational to take offense to the "one-drop" rule, a historical
approach to race in this country which assigned a Black racial identity to
59.

See, e.g.,JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDARIES

115-17 (1978) (1977); RUTH G. MckoY & Louis A. ZURCHERJR.,TRANRACIAL AND INRACIAL
ADOPTEES:THuE ADOLESCENTYEARS 138-39 (1983); Ruth G. McRoy et a., The Identity of Transracial Adoptees, 65 Soc. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 34, 38-39 (1984); Arnold R.
Silverman & William Feigelman, Adjustment in InterracialAdoptees:An Overview, in THE PSYCHOLOGY Or ADOPTION 187, 197-98 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds.,

1990).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
FOcG-DAvIs, supra note 1,at 53.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 96.
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anyone with either provable or discernable Black ancestry.6 In addition, it is
not unreasonable to reject, as Fogg-Davis does, the idea that racial categories
are somehow "natural. '67 In recent years, many scholars have challenged the
notion of separate races, theorizing race as a social construction rather than a
biological reality., The popularity of post-modernism has also brought to the
idea of race the notion of shifting identities. 69 Still other scholars have argued
that the traditional focus of the study of race on the relationship between
Blacks and Whites is a limiting "Black/White binary" which fails to incorporate racial complexity and the experiences of other minority groups.7"
However, despite their positions on the biology or morality of racial
classifications, many people that society identifies as Black understand racial
designations as a practical reality. As Professor John Calmore has noted,
whether or not there is something called race, there clearly is something
called racism." For many Blacks, therefore the problems of racial discrimination and racial hierarchy may be more of a practical problem than the actual
label of "race." The heroic struggle is more likely to be defined as resistance
to racial oppression rather than resistance to racial designations.
The argument that those who are the product of Black and White interracial relationships should not automatically accept a Black racial identity
is certainly legitimate. If this is Fogg-Davis' argument, she needs to be explicit. However, the argument is still a controversial one. Historically, the
exercise of choice about racial identity by those Blacks not clearly identified
' 72
as Black on the basis of physical appearance has been termed "passing.
Many feel passing has become obsolete in light of the diverse cultural and
racial backgrounds of an increasing number of Americans. Today, legal
66.

Id. at 17; see also Joel Perlmann, Reflecting the Changing Face ofAmerica: Multiracials,

Racial Classification,and American Intermarriage,in INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE
IN AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND LAw 506,528 (Werner Sollors ed., 2000). See generally
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM,JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 34-41 (1996) (discussion of the historical development of defi-

nitions of race in the United States).
67.
FOGG-DAvIs, supra note 1, at 58.
68.
See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HowARD WiNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994);JuAN F PERFA Er AL., RACE AND RACES:
CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 50-90 (2000) (exploring various approaches

to the concept of race).
69.
K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS:THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 104 (1996).
70.
See, e.g., Cynthia KweiYung Lee, Race and Se!f-Defense:Toward a Normative Conception
of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (arguing that issues concerning non-Whites
other than Blacks are overlooked);Juan F Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm ofRace:The
"Normal Science" ofAmerican RacialThought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (arguing that Mexican-American struggles are overlooked).
71.
John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race:An Essayfor
"Naked People Longing to Swim Free," 15 LAw & INEQ. 25,28 (1997) (arguing that in discussing whether distinct races exist, it is important to discuss the oppressive conditions of racism).
72.
See Perlmann, supra note 66, at 528.
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arguments that biracial persons have a right to a unique racial identity that is
neither Black norWhite might be grounded in concepts of privacy or a right
to be free of state sponsored racial classifications. The focus of Fogg-Davis'
book is on ethics rather than law, so it is not surprising that she does not pursue such legal arguments.
Fogg-Davis' arguments regarding racial identity are certain to raise the
ire of many Blacks who strongly believe that Black political unity is undermined when some Blacks claim a separate racial identity. From that
perspective, the struggle for racial equality is most effective when Blacks, regardless of racial features or biracial heritage, combine their resources and
talents without intraracial distinctions. Many individuals whom society considers Black but who are, in fact, the product of one Black and one White
parent, or otherwise possess a mixed racial heritage, choose to unequivocally,
publicly and privately, embrace a Black racial identity for personal and political reasons.73 Fogg-Davis' principle of "racial navigation" is interesting but it
is not clear that it defines an experience unique to transracial adoptees. In
addition, Fogg-Davis does not go far enough in addressing the obvious and
troubling practical implications of telling Black children they can choose
their own race.
B. Racial Randomization
The second theoretical thread Fogg-Davis introduces in The Ethics of
Transracial Adoption is "racial randomization," which she describes as a
"thought experiment" in which the reader is invited to imagine that rather
than being assigned to parents with racial considerations in mind, children
available for adoption are randomly assigned to those seeking to become
adoptive parents. 4 Fogg-Davis argues that the value of thinking about racial
''
randomization is "to tweak our moral intuitions about nondiscrimination.
She urges us to think about Black children being adopted by White parents,
and she also urges that Blacks be encouraged to adopt White children. She
suggests the latter not only because such transracial adoptions would benefit
their own families, but also "to show others that [B]lacks can successfully par' 76
ent [W]hite children.
This exercise builds on the earlier work of legal scholars who have
noted that a true system of colorblind adoption would be one in which children are assigned to adoptive parents either on a random basis or on the basis

73.
See, e.g.,SHIRLEETAYLOR HAIZLIPTHE SWEETER THEJUICE 13-15 (1994); LISAJONES,
BULLETPROOF DIvA:TALES OF RACE, SEX, AND HAIR 53-66 (1994). Both books are about Black

women of mixed racial heritage who choose to embrace a Black identity.
74.
Fogg-Davis, supra note 1, at 11,78.
75.
Id. at 74.
76.
Id. at 81.
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of first-come, first served." For example, in two previous articles on transracial adoption, I argued that the only true colorblind system of adoption
would be one in which all children are assigned to adoptive parents without
regard to race."8 Professor Richard Banks takes this argument further and argues that permitting adoptive parents to select children on the basis of racial
classification constitutes state sponsored racial discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Banks argues
that although a significant public controversy has arisen over same-race
matching in the case of Black parents and Black children,White prospective
adoptive parents are routinely permitted to select White children for adoption. Banks further argues that this virtually unexamined practice has the
effect of categorically denying to Black children, especially those in foster
care, the opportunity to be considered individually for inclusion in the families of many adoptive parents. According to Banks, all prospective adoptive
children have a constitutional right to be chosen for adoption without regard
to state sponsored racial bias. He further argues that the denial to Black children of individual consideration for adoption by all prospective adoptive
parents is precisely the kind of harm the Supreme Court has identified as resulting from racial classifications.'
Banks proposes a policy of
nonaccommodation in which agencies that receive public funding must make
it clear to prospective adoptive parents that their racial preferences can play
no role in their selection of a child to adopt.8
Fogg-Davis notes that although racial randomization and Banks' proposal of nonaccommodation share the same constitutional basis, her"thought
experiment" is not a policy recommendation, but rather is "designed to motivate adoption practitioners and prospective adopters to question their own
racial biases and expectations, and how such prejudice may conflict with the
moral rights of children awaiting adoption not to be discriminated against on
the basis of their racial ascription. 82 She notes that she differs from Banks'
view that Black families should be exempted from his proposed nonaccommodation policy. Rather, she believes that racial randomization should apply
equally to all prospective adoptive parents and children.
It is peculiar that Fogg-Davis devotes so much effort to arguing the
merits of random assignment and then shoots down the idea as impractical.
77.
SeeJoan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll:TransracialAdoptionand Cultural Preservation,
59 UMKC L. Rv. 487,498-99 (1991); Perry, The TransracialAdoptionControversy, supra note
5, at 102-04; Perry, Race and Child Placement,supra note 8, at 120-23.
78.
See Perry, The TransracialAdoptionControversy, supranote 5,at 102-04; Perry, Race and
Child Placement,supra note 8, at 120-23.
79.
R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: FulfillingAdoptive Parents' Racial Preferences
Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875,880-81 (1998).
80.
81.
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83.
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She states that she advances the proposal in order to "tweak" our imaginations
about the ethics of matching children by race.84 However, she admits that she
fears the possibility that matching White parents with Black children would
drive many Whites from the adoption system.8" The defection of so many
potential adoptive parents from the adoption system would clearly hurt the
interests of children of all backgrounds who are in need of adoption. It seems
clear that a "thought experiment" or policy recommendation based on a
premise that race does not matter in adoption collapses upon closer examination.
The lengthy and passionate arguments Fogg-Davis presents throughout
the book against racial designations suggest that her sympathies lie much
closer to the colorblindness position on adoption than she is willing to admit.
Fogg-Davis' sympathy for the colorblind approach is also exemplified by the
fact that she believes that Black families should not be exempted from Banks'
proposed nonaccommodation to adoptive families' racial preferences.The fact
that she essentially rejects the "survival skills" argument often advanced to
justify same-race adoptive placement of Black children, also suggests that
Fogg-Davis is sympathetic to the colorblind approach. The "survival skills"
argument is really nothing more than support for the idea that Black children's burden of navigating a race-conscious world should be facilitated by
the support of Black parents who have done precisely that all of their lives. It
seems contradictory to support the position that it can be appropriate to consider race in adoptive placement and at the same time reject the argument
that Black parents offer Black children anything unique.
In light of Fogg-Davis' arguments against imposed racial labels, and in
favor of racial self-definition, it is surprising that she does not take an explicit
position on the recent controversy over a multiracial Census category. She
mentions this debate87 but does not discuss it in detail. The essence of that
controversy centers on the very issue that appears to be a major, although
unarticulated, focus of this book-the power of biracial people to reject ascribed racial definitions and select their own racial identities.88 Nor does the
84.
85.

Id. at 74.
See id. at 87.

86.
Id. at 58-63. See Perry, The TransracialAdoption Controversy, supra note 5, at 61-65,
for a discussion of the "survival skills" debate in transracial adoption. Opponents of transracial
adoption often argue that Black parents are in the best position to provide Black children
with the skills they will need to survive in a racist society. Writers from the colorblind perspective tend to be skeptical or even dismissive of this argument and argue that White
adoptive parents can do at least as good ajob in providing Black children with these skills. See
id. at 61 n. 129,90-91 (noting criticisms of the survival skills argument). Opponents oftransracial adoption may see White skepticism of the survival skills argument as yet another
indication of the invisibility to most Whites of Black people's lives and struggles. Id. at 64.
87.
FOGG-DAvis, supra note 1, at 17.
88.
The 2000 Census permitted individuals to select more than one racial category,but
did not include the "multiracial" category that some had argued for. Id. See Tanya Kateri
Hernindez,"Multiracial"Discourse: Racial Classificationsinan Era of Color-BlindJurisprudence,57
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book address the question of whether fixed racial categories should be abandoned generally or what the potential consequences of this might be for the
anti-discrimination struggle.The argument that race is fluid, indeterminate, or
meaningless intersects comfortably with recent colorblindjurisprudence that
seeks to dismantle affirmative action by arguing that racial classifications are
inherently evil. The Supreme Court, for example, has adopted this approach
in several recent cases in which it struck down affirmative action programs
intended to assist minority government contractors.89 Proponents of transracial adoption have argued that the same kind of strict scrutiny that the
Supreme Court applied in affirmative action cases must apply to same-race
preferences in adoption.'
In their zeal to eliminate a preference for placing Black children with
Black adoptive parents, some advocates of transracial adoption have entered
into an unfortunate alliance with opponents of affirmative action in other

MD. L. REV. 97 (1998), for a critique of the movement for a multiracial census category and

the argument that multiracial discourse dove-tails with recent colorblind discourse and jurisprudence in ways that impact negatively on the struggle for racial equality.
89.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995) (holding that
all racial classifications imposed by a governmental actor must be analyzed under strict scrutiny); id. at 241 (Thomas,J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[R]acial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by
malicious prejudice."); City ofRichmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to affirmative action); id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[r]acial preferences appear to "even the score" . . . only if one embraces the
proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races"). Some legal scholars argue that racial classifications are inherently wrong. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND
LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRsTHAND AccouNTr 90 (1991) (arguing that
one of the most important principles of the constitution is "the basic right of every person to
be considered as a distinct individual and not in terms of the groups to which government
says he belongs"). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding affirmative
action program in higher education).
90.
See Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1228-37. However, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984), the Supreme Court held that furtherance of the best interests of the child was not a
compelling state interest. Instead, the Supreme Court held that it was a "substantial governmental interest," a less strict standard. Id. at 433. In addition, Palmore was a custody dispute
between parents, and the law has long recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in the custody of their children. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder.") Prospective adoptive parents do not have any recognized
equivalent rights. Finally, in Palmore, the court held that race could not be the sole factor in
the determination of custody in the case. 466 U.S. at 432-33. It did not, however, hold that
race could not be considered as one of many factors.Transracial adoption raises different issues than affirmative action. Most affirmative action cases involve the distribution of benefits
that have a present or future economic value such as jobs, college admissions, or government
contracts.Also, in affirmative action disputes, the object of the dispute-the benefit itself-has
no independent interest, unlike a child. See Perry, The TransracialAdoption Controversy, supra
note 5, at 100-02, for a further discussion of the distinction between the two contexts.
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areas such as education and employment.91 The latter have used the transracial
adoption controversy to further their real agenda, which is to dismantle all
remedial race-conscious programs. This agenda is not in the best interests of
the majority of Black children, and it is tragic that some advocates of transracial adoption have permitted themselves to be used in this way, particularly at
a moment in time when the movement to eliminate race-conscious remedies

continues to gain momentum. For example, Ward Connerly, the California
businessman who was the prime initiator of Proposition 209, which ended
California's affirmative action programs,9 2 recently proposed a "Racial Privacy
Initiative" which sought to prevent the state government from classifying any
persons by race in the operation of public education, public contracting, or
public employment. 3 Although it was voted down, the proposal would have
prohibited the government from even compiling any information or statistics
concerning race.94 The consequences of such a law, particularly if widely
adopted, would virtually cripple efforts to achieve racial justice.9
Fogg-Davis' opposition to placing children into racial categories must
be examined in light of the practice's societal consequences, and ultimately, its
effect on the struggle for racial equality. If it is not ethical to place children in
racial categories in the context of adoption or other areas of life, is it ethical
to place adults into them? And if we do not, how do we keep track of the
progress of Blacks and other minority groups in terms of employment opportunities, health, education, and other areas? These are important issues that
need to be addressed in any discussion of the justifications for, or objections
to, racial designations.
Fogg-Davis also persuasively argues that there is a need to incorporate
more voices of transracially adopted individuals into the debate.The literature
on transracial adoption does discuss the rights and interests of transracially
adopted children, and many of the scholars that conducted research studies

91.
See FOGG-DAvis, supra note 1, at 44 (noting the alliance on transracial adoption
between Harvard Law School Professors Randall Kennedy and Elizabeth Bartholet and the
conservative Institute for Justice, which opposes all affirmative action programs); Perry, The
TransracialAdoption Controversy, supra note 5, at 77-78 (noting the alliance between liberal
colorblind individualists and racial conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s).
92.
See California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 31.
93.
See Press Advisory, Racial Privacy Initiative Campaign Launched, at http://
www.racialprivacy.org/content/press/april09-2001.php (Apr. 9, 2001). See Racial Privacy
Initiative, RPI Language, at http://www.racialprivacy.org/content/language.php (last visited
Oct. 23, 2003), for the text of the proposed statute.The initiative was defeated by voters with
63.9% voting against the initiative and 36.1% voting in favor of it. See California Secretary of
State Statewide Special Election Official Website, State Ballot Measure, Statewide Returns, at
http://vote2003.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
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interviewed the children and incorporated the findings into their conclusions.96 Fogg-Davis makes a valid point if she is arguing that the voices of the
children could be made more explicit in the transracial adoption debate. It is
also important, as others have argued, to incorporate the voices ofbirthmothers into the analysis of both transracial and international adoption, who are
often pressured to surrender their children for adoption as a result of the triple pressures of racism, patriarchy, and poverty."
Fogg-Davis' suggestion of broadening the discussion of transracial adoption is valid, but in the end her "thought experiment" of assigning children
for adoption without regard to race is of limited utility She herself concedes
that implementing such a policy would be impractical, and indeed, because of
the very factor of racism, would threaten the viability of the entire adoption
system. Furthermore, Fogg-Davis does not explore the implications of extending her "thought experiment" of eliminating the significance of race in
adoption to other contexts, such as employment or the maintenance of statistics tracking racial progress.
CONCLUSION
Transracial adoption is one of the most complex contemporary racial issues. Because the number of children actually affected is so small, the issue has
little practical relevance when compared to the major, devastating social problems faced by the majority of Black children. However, the debate over
transracial adoption is important at a symbolic level because it sheds light on
many sensitive and complex issues concerning race. In that respect, there is
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See, e.g., SIMON & ROORDA, supra note 29; Susan R. Harris, Race, Search, and My
Baby-Self: Reflections of a TransracialAdoptee,9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 5 (1997); see also Isaacs,
supra note 29.
97.
See Perry, Transracialand InternationalAdoption, supra note 8, at 107, 138-61. On the
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seems misplaced. See FOGG-DAvIs, supra note 1, at 60.A number of the studies of transracial
adoption are longitudinal. Moreover, even in the early cases in which a number of courts
expressed opposition to, or strong reservations about transracial adoption, their focus was still
on the question of the potential long-term emotional effects on the children, rather than
solely on the event of adoptive placement. During the earlier years of transracial adoption,
the discussion about anticipated problems in adolescence was so frequent that it became
known as "the puberty argument." See Perry Race and Child Placement,supra note 8, at 78-79
(citing MARRIAGE AcRoss THE COLOR LINE 72-73 (Clotye M. Larsson ed., 1965)); Susan J.
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color:Race as a Factorin Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17
BUFF. L. REV. 303,330 (1968); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption:Analysisof the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 541-45 (1984). Such discussions might be
interpreted as racism on the part of those who raised the issue or as sincere concerns about
societal hostility toward interracial marriage. Still, they indicate that the discussion of transracial adoption often went beyond the matter of initial placement and incorporated discussion
of potential long-term concerns.
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much to disagree about. It is therefore important for scholars to continue to
bring multiple perspectives to the subject.
The book's focus on ethical issues is a significant contribution to the literature on transracial adoption.There is an apparent inconsistency between
Fogg-Davis' position that race should be a permissible factor in adoptive
placements and her argument that society should resist giving children racial
designations. However, the book ultimately raises many interesting issues
about the social construction of race and the significance of race to personal
identity. Further, the question it raises, although not explicitly, about the racial
identity of biracial children is a legitimate one. This question in particular
warrants further exploration in a frank and open dialogue.

